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However, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark,2 1 once
past the issue of jurisdiction to review, poses an interesting question
of statutory interpretation. It is his contention that the act providing for judicial review based on "all available records" means all the
records of an inductee's life both before and during his service in the
Army; that the Court's limitation of the statute to only the soldier's
military record is "lacking of justification." 22 It is submitted that
Justice Clark's interpretation is more consonant with the wording
of the statute and the probable intent of Congress.

)X
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-FORMAL HEARING AND EVALUATION OF
CONDUCT UNDERLYING APPLICANT'S PREVIOUS CONVICTION HELD
NECESSARY FOR REFUSAL OF BROKER'S LICENSE.-Petitioner was re-

fused a broker's license by the Superintendent of Insurance without
a formal hearing, on the ground that he was not "trustworthy" within
the meaning of that requirement of the Insurance Law. The Superintendent's decision was predicated on petitioner's previous conviction for refusing to be inducted into military service after having been
denied classification as a conscientious objector. Petitioner's proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to obtain an annulment
of the Superintendent's determination was dismissed by the Supreme
Court, Special Term. The Appellate Division affirmed. In reversing
and remitting to the Superintendent of Insurance for further action,
the New York Court of Appeals held that petitioner was entitled to
a formal hearing which might establish a judicially reviewable record.
The Superintendent was instructed to go behind the previous conviction and evaluate petitioner's underlying conduct in determining
whether he met the requirement of the statute. Koster v. Holz
3 N.Y.2d 639, 148 N.E.2d 287, 171 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1958).
When not specified by statute, the requirement of a hearing has
generally been predicated upon an individual's substantive rights
being adversely affected by agency action; 1 where a mere privilege is
denied or revoked no such hearing is required. 2 The requirement of
a hearing has been given special emphasis in regard to the granting
or refusing of a license necessary to engage in certain occupations.3
Statutes prescribing licenses to practice as a physician, 4 to prosecute
21 Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 583 (1958).
22
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4 Gage v. Censors of Eclectic Medical Soc'y, 63 N.H. 92 (1884).
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claims before an official board, 5 and to deal in alcohol 6 have been
held to require a hearing before an applicant can be rightly refused;
in these cases the applicants had satisfied all technical or professional
requisites and were rejected solely because not "worthy of public
confidence." The United States Supreme Court held in Bratton v.
Chandler7 that a statute requiring real estate brokers to be licensed
must be construed as requiring notice and a hearing prior to a refusal to issue a license. As an exception to the rule, in some rigidly
controlled areas thought to be of doubtful morality, licenses have been
refused and revoked without hearing as a matter of public policy.8
Often, revocation or refusal to renew a license requires notice
and hearing 9 even where initial refusal to grant the license does not,
the courts considering that an established business or profession is
a valuable franchise which cannot be destroyed without at least quasijudicial proceedings. 10 The practice of a profession or an occupation
has been considered to involve a property right even prior to the
granting of a license to practice."
The general rule in New York is that a superintendent or commissioner, in the exercise of his discretion, may not arbitrarily or
capriciously refuse a license.' 2 Any refusal must be predicated
upon pertinent and reasonable grounds. 13 In Perpente v. Moss,'14 it
was held that a license may not be refused on the ground that the
applicant is not of good character unless the applicant has a fair
opportunity to refute the conclusion and unless the court of review is
apprised of the specific basis for the agency's finding.
Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
6 Smith v. Foster, 15 F.2d 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).

7260 U.S. 110 (1922).
8 Saloon licenses-Boerner v. Thompson, 278 Ill. 153, 115 N.E. 866 (1917)
Martin v. State, 23 Neb. 371, 36 N.W. 554 (1888), aff'd, 27 Neb. 325, 43 N.W.
108 (1889).
Pool room license-Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578 (1882).
Dance hall license-People ex rel. Ritter v. Wallace, 160 App. Div. 787,
145 N.Y. Supp. 1041 (2d Dep't 1914) (per curiam).
Licenses to operate a motor vehicle have also been revoked without hearing.
LaPlante v. Board of Pub. Roads, 47 R.I. 258, 131 AtI. 641 (1926); Law v.
Commissioner, 171 Va. 449, 199 S.E. 516 (1938). See also 4 Wis. L. REV.

180, 185 (1927).
9 Courier-Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 46 F.2d 614 (D.C. Cir.
1931); Blunt v. Shepardson, 286 Ill. 84, 121 N.E. 263 (1918); Lillienfeld v.
Commonwealth, 92 Va. 818, 23 S.E. 882 (1896).
10 Board of Health v. McCoy, 125 Ill. 289, 297, 17 N.E. 786,
11 See Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law,

788 (1888).
86 U. PA. L.
REv. 691, 711-23 (1938). See also Globe Indem. Co. v. Bruce, 81 F.2d 143, 150
(10th Cir. 1935); DAVIs, ADmNsTRATIvE LAW 250 (1951).
12 People ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 219 N.Y. 84, 113
N.E. 795 (1916); BENJA .%IN,
OF Naw YORK 327 (1942).
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13 Fink v. Cole, 1 N.Y.2d 48, 133 N.E.2d 691, 150 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1956);
Goldman v. Pink, 253 App. Div. 862, 1 N.Y.S.2d 562 (3d Dep't 1938) (per
curiam).
14 293 N.Y. 325, 56 N.E.2d 726 (1944).
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The Court in the principal case deemed it unnecessary to do
more than interpret the applicable sections of the Insurance Law and
their legislative history in order to find that a formal hearing was
required. By section 119 of the Insurance Law the Superintendent
of Insurance has the discretionary power to issue a broker's license
to any qualified individual who ". . . is deemed by him trustworthy
and competent to act as a broker. . . ." 15 Section 119(12) grants
a rejected applicant the right to judicial review, and section 34 provides that such proceedings are to take place under article 78 of the
Civil Practice Act. The Court reasoned that since the predecessor
of section 119(12) and section 34 provided that review be by order
of certiorari, 16 proceedings under the current statutes would also be
of that nature. 1 7 Then, of necessity, there would have to be a formal8
hearing at which a record was made, for certiorari requires a record.'
Traditionally, it is more the statutory requirement of a formal hearing, expressed or implied, that gives rise to review by certiorari than
vice versa, 19 and the Court of necessity must have assumed that the
legislature intended formal hearings although it did not so specify
in the statute. Review in cases
where there is no required hearing
20
was generally by mandamus.
After deciding that a hearing was required, the Court in an
extended dictum discussed the validity of the Superintendent's decision that petitioner's prior conviction was sufficient evidence of
untrustworthiness. The conviction of a crime involving moral turpiApplicant had fulfilled all other requirements of the statute.
16Section 119(12), as supplemented by §34, replaced former §143(13)
of the N.Y. Insurance Law, Laws 1936, c. 625, §9, which then provided
that the action of the. Superintendent of Insurance in such matters was
subject to review by order of certiorari. In 1937, New York abolished the
traditional remedies of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition by the enactment
of article 78 of the Civil Practice Act with the resulting change in the
Insurance Law.
17 Relying on 1939 LEG. Doe. No. 101, REPOiiT, JOINT LEGIsLATIVE Co]trrrrE ON REVISION OF INsURANcE LAWS, the opinion of the Court was that
the legislature did not intend to restrict the rights of the persons affected.
Koster v. Holz, 3 N.Y.2d 639, 646, 148 N.E.2d 287, 291, 171 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71
15

(1958).
18 See Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 174-75, 33 N.E.2d 75,
80-81 (1941); New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 271 N.Y. 103, 2 N.E.2d 277
(1936); In re Standard Bitulithic Co., 212 N.Y. 179, 105 N.E. 967 (1914).
Although certiorari, mandamus and prohibition have been abolished, the courts
have found it necessary to fall back on these traditional forms of relief because of doubts as to what can be achieved by the simplified petition procedure.

Carrow, Types of Judicial Relief From Administrative Action, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 1-2 (1958).
Thus, in the instant case, the Court relies on the procedural
requirements of certiorari in establishing the necessity of a formal hearing and
record. Koster v. Holz, 3 N.Y.2d 639, 645-46, 148 N.E.2d 287, 290-91, 171
N.Y.S.2d 65, 70 (1958).
'1 West Flagler Amusement Co. v. State Racing Comm'n, 122 Fla. 222,
165 So. 64 (1935); 22 CARMODY-WAIT, NEw YORK PRACTICE 134-35 (1956).
20 Small v. Moss, 277 N.Y. 501, 14 N.E.2d 808 (1938).
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tude has been considered in the past sufficient evidence of untrustworthiness to warrant refusal 21 or suspension 22 of a license by an
agency granted such discretion. But conviction of a crime not requiring mens rea is not of itself conclusive evidence of untrustworthiness. 23 Conversely, the New York Court of Appeals has affirmed
a holding that acquittal in a criminal action was not res judicata in
determining character and fitness of an attorney, and that the under24
lying conduct of the applicant in the matter might be evaluated.
The verdict in the criminal action was not conclusive evidence regarding the character of the applicant in the circumstances from which
the criminal charge arose. The Court in the principal case maintained that the applicant might possibly have been convicted originally, although sincere in his objections to military service, and if
such were the case, the conviction would not reflect upon his trustworthiness within the meaning of the Insurance Law. 2 5
In 1951, the date of petitioner's conviction, the Universal Military Training Law allowed the classification of conscientious objector to any person who ".

.

. by reason of religious training and belief,

is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 26
The statute further states that religious training and belief means
"... belief in relation to a Supreme Being ...

but does not include

essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code." 27 Therefore, the applicant might have been
refused the classification although espousing sincere sociological,
21
22

See 1927 Ops. AT-r'y GEN. 119, 123, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12 (1928).

In Zdrojeski v. Dineen, 268 App. Div. 877, 50 N.Y.S.2d 691 (2d Dep't
1944), an insurance broker who entered a plea of guilty for violating the
National Housing Act was properly determined to be untrustworthy and his
license was properly suspended. See also Tompkins v. Board of Regents, 299
N.Y. 469, 87 N.E.2d 517 (1949).
23In re Silverman, 183 Misc. 264, 49 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1944), where
it was held that a police commissioner could not withhold a hack license for
conviction of a misdemeanor, although he could for a felony conviction; Baker
v. Miller, 236 Ind. 20, 138 N.E.2d 145 (1956), where an attorney convicted of
filing a false and "fraudulent" income tax return could not be disbarred under
a statute providing for disbarment of an attorney convicted of a felony, since
evasion of income taxes is not an offense involving moral turpitude. Defendant, who had pleaded guilty in the prosecution for tax evasion, was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of nine months. Cf. 1927 Ops. ATr'y
GEN., supra note 21. For an extensive discussion of crimes neither involving
moral turpitude nor requiring a mns rea, see Comment, 1956 Wis. L. REv.
625-67. See also Hall, Ignorance and Mistake It Criinhal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1
(1957); Mueller, Mens Rea And The Law Without It, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 34

(1955).
24

Application of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (2d Dep't
1944), reargument denied, 270 App. Div. 1046, 63 N.Y.S.2d 840 (2d Dep't
1946), aff'd inem., 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947).
25Koster v. Holz, 3 N.Y.2d 639, 646-48, 148 N.E.2d 287, 291-92, 171
N.Y.S.2d 65, 71-73 (1958).
26 62 STAT. 612 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (Supp. V 1952).
27 Ibid.
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philosophical, or political objections, and have subsequently been convicted for persisting in his principles. Furthermore, recent developments in the substantive and procedural law in the area might possibly have effected a result other than conviction. The interpretation
of the requirement of "religious training" as used in the statute has
been liberalized in one district court,28 and the United States Supreme
Court has enlarged the ability of an individual
to gain judicial appeal
29
of Selective Service Board classifications.
Although the rationale of the Court in arriving at the necessity
of a hearing appears tenuous, the result achieved is equitable. Conviction per se can hardly be considered conclusive evidence of untrustworthiness in this era of crime without culpability, and evaluation
of conduct would seem the better test in determining an applicant's
character.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
REINSTATEMENT HELD NOT CONDITION PRECEDENT TO SUIT FOR
SALARY WHERE PLAINTIFF SHOWS CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT TO

PosITION.-Pursuant to section 903 of the New York City Charter,'
plaintiffs were dismissed from city colleges in 1953 for pleading their
privilege against self-incrimination before a legislative subcommittee.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently held a similar application of the charter provision to another city college employee
28 In re Hansen, 148 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1957), 32 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
105 (1957).
29 Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953);
Comment, 50 Nw.
U.L. REv. 660, 668-69 (1955). In Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944),
the Supreme Court held that defendant was not entitled to review in a criminal
proceeding for violation of the Universal Military Training Law. However,
in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), the Court reversed its stand and
assumed a jurisdiction which was subsequently enlarged by the Dickinson case.

1 "If any councilman or other officer or employee of the city shall, after
lawful notice or process, wilfully refuse or fail to appear before any court
or judge, any legislative committee, or any officer, board or body authorized
to conduct any hearing or inquiry, or having appeared shall refuse to testify
or to answer any question regarding the property, government or affairs of
the city or of any county included within its territorial limits, or regarding
the nomination, election, appointment or official conduct of any officer or
employee of the city or of any such county, on the ground that his answer
would tend to incriminate him, or shall refuse to waive immunity from prosecution on account of any such matter in relation to which he may be asked to
testify upon any such hearing or inquiry, his term or tenure of office or employment shall terminate and such office or employment shall be vacant, and
he shall not be eligible to election or appointment to any office or employment
under the city or any agency." N.Y.C. CHARTER § 903.

